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We analyse the effect of overconfidence in a model of team-production with effort comple-
mentarities. We show that overconfidence may not only enhance an overconfident agent’s 
effort but also that of a rational one. Focusing the agents’ payoffs we see that this increase in 
effort can be to the agents’ benefit, regardless whether they are rational or overconfident. We 
take this notion to NBA-data which we have gained from the season 2009/10 and see that 
players who have been identified as overconfident have a significantly positive effect on their 
team’s success. 
 
JEL-Codes: D21, D62, L23. 
 
 II 
Overconfidence und Team-Performance: 





Wir betrachten den Effekt von Overconfidence mit Hilfe eines intuitiven Modells einer Team-
Produktion mit komplementären Arbeitseinsätzen. Es zeigt sich, dass Overconfidence nicht 
nur den Arbeitseinsatz des betroffenen Agenten erhöht, sondern gleichzeitig den eines ratio-
nalen Teammitglieds. Hieraus resultiert ein Nutzenvorteil für die Agenten, unabhängig davon, 
ob sie selbst rational oder overconfident sind. Daten der NBA-Saison von 2009/10 zeigen, 
dass Spieler, welche als overconfident identifiziert wurden, einen signifikant positiven Effekt 
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In this paper we analyse the effect of NBA-players’ overconﬁdence on their teams’ overall performance.
First take a general model of team-production with effort-synergies from [1] into account and show how
an agent’s overconﬁdence may enhance his team’s output as well as the individual payoffs of the rational
and – more interestingly – the overconﬁdent agents. This result may seem counterintuitive as a self-
perception deviating from rationality should be eliminated by learning-mechanisms or market-forces.
In a second step we take this notion to NBA-data (which we have gained from the season 2009/10).
In this context we derive a player’s self-perception from his performance in crunch time (4th quarter or
overtime, less than 5 minutes of playing time left, neither team ahead by more than 5 points). Using
Plus-Minus-Stats as a measure of team-performance we are able to show that players who are identiﬁed as
overconﬁdent (their ﬁeld-goal percentage drops by more than 10 percentage points during crunchtime)
have a signiﬁcantly positive impact on their team’s success, even though their overconﬁdence should have
a detrimental effect at ﬁrst sight.
Research on the effects of overconﬁdence in sports is quite scarce. [2] analyse draft choices in the
National Football League and show that the ability to pick the "right" player is systematically overesti-
mated. Additionally, they ﬁnd evidence for the winner’s curse as the right to pick ﬁrst is more a curse
than a blessing. [3] conducted a shooting-experiment with basketball players which reveals that most
players were overconﬁdent and that those who were experienced less joy from their outcome. We might
compare the expected effect of overconﬁdent players on their teammates to the effect of trust in formal
(coach or team captain) or informal (other teammates) leaders on performance. Several psychological
studies analyse the effect of trust in small groups and different environments. [4] for example shows that
a teams performance is positively affected by the trust in coaches as leaders.1
Our contribution is of various kinds: First, we are able to give a theoretical rationale for the persistent
phenomenon of overconﬁdence (see e.g. [5]; [6]; or [7]; and more recently [8]; [9]; or [10]). Second, we
show that even in situations where learning is very likely to occur (immediate feedback on one’s own
performance, which is repeated many times) overconﬁdence might be a persistent phenomenon as is leads
to positive outcome. Finally, we want to emphasise the importance of a) the knowledge of a players self-
perception and show how it could be measured and b) it’s effect on a team’s performance in a competitive
situation.
2 Model
The framework we take into account is a basic model of team-production from [1] where a principal
hires two agents for production. The production-technology requires the use of teams in order to ben-
eﬁt from effort-complementarities between the agents. We assume that all participation-constraints are
binding2 and that the principal as well as both agents are risk-neutral. In order to examine the effect
of overconﬁdence on the agents’ choices of effort and the resulting payoffs we take payments given and
therefore need not to consider the principals problem of inducing effort.
Both agents utility is additively separable into income and effort-cost. Finally we assume agent 1 to be
rational and agent 2 to suffer from an overconﬁdence bias, which leads to the following utility functions:
U1(e1,e2) = R(e1,e2) − C(e1), (1)
with R(e1,e2) as the return-function of effort and C(e1) as the cost of effort. Accordingly the ﬁrst order
condition is given by:
Re1(e1,e2) = C0(e1) (2)
and the second order condition is satisﬁed if:
Re1e1 − C00(e1) < 0. (3)
1[4] gives an excellent review of recent studies on this matter.
2Both agents might be wealth-constrained.
2Taking agent 2’s biased self-perception into account, his utility is given by:
U2(e1,e2) = R(e1,e2,b) − C(e2). (4)
The ﬁrst order condition is given by:
Re2(e1,e2) = C0(e2) (5)
and the second order condition is satisﬁed if:
Re2e2 − C00(e2) < 0. (6)
Overconﬁdence increases effort of agent 2, taken the effort of agent 1 given, if the marginal return to







The Nash-equilibrium efforts are e1(b) and e2(b). Hence the reduced-form payoff of agent 1 is:
U1(e1(b),e2(b)) = R(e1(b),e2(b)) − C(e1(b)). (8)

















The ﬁrst term is the mistaken beliefs effect which is, naturally (and by the envelope theorem), zero for
the rational agent. Therefore the effect of overconﬁdence on the payoff of agent 1 drives solely from the
sign of the strategic effect through synergy which is positive. Hence the payoff of agent 1 increases in the
overconﬁdence of agent 2.
The reduced form payoff of agent 2 is given by:
U2(e1(b),e2(b)) = R(e1(b),e2(b)) − C(e2(b)). (10)






























with the sign of de1
de2 as the sign of the slope of the best reply function, which is positive if efforts are
strategic complements (which is equivalent to the assumption of effort synergies). Hence, the sign of the
strategic effect is positive as long as efforts are complements and the marginal return to effort of agent 2
increases with his overconﬁdence. Taking the strategic effect into account, the overconﬁdence of agent 2
increases the effort of agent 1, which in is beneﬁcial for agent 2.
The second term is the mistaken beliefs effect, which sign is negative since agent 2 is exerting too
much effort regarding his true abilities, that is e2(b) > argmaxe2 R(e1(b),e2) − C(e2), which implies
that Re2(e1(b),e2(b)) < C0(e2(b)). [1] show that, accordingly the trade off between the strategic effect
and the mistaken beliefs effect is assertive for the impact of agent 2’s overconﬁdence on his own payoff:
If synergy is large the strategic effect dominates and agent 2 beneﬁts from his own biased self-perception.
33 Empirical Evidence
Prior to analysing the effect of overconﬁdent NBA-players on their teammates we need to think of a
measure for overconﬁdence of basketball-players. In the following we identify overconﬁdent players
by analysing their performance in crunchtime.3 A player is identiﬁed as overconﬁdent if his ﬁeld goal
percentage decreases by at least 10 percentage points during crunchtime compared to his average overall
ﬁeld goal percentage. If more than one player of a team fulﬁlls this criterion the player with the highest
decrease in ﬁeld goal percentage is taken into account in our analysis.
The preliminary data set4 contains of the ﬁrst 531 games of the 2009/2010 NBA-season. According
to our measure of overconﬁdence, in this season only three teams (Chicago Bulls, Denver Nuggets and
Orlando Magic) have no overconﬁdent player. Table 1 shows the (most) overconﬁdent players of the
remaining teams and shows how many of the games they played ended in crunchtime and how long they
played in these periods. Additionally, the average overall ﬁeld goal percentages and those in crunchtime
of the 2009/2010 seasons are shown as well as their differences.
The overconﬁdent players of the 27 teams show an averaged 18 percentage point decrease in their
ﬁeld goal percentage during crunchtime compared to the overall ﬁeld goal percentage (see Table 1).
After identifying the relevant overconﬁdent players for every game and both teams in every game
two types of Plus-Minus-Stats5 are derived for all teammembers: On the one hand the performance
(Plus-Minus-Stats) of each player while the overconﬁdent player is on court is derived and on the other
hand the performance (Plus-Minus-Stats) of each player while the overconﬁdent player is off court.6
Deleting those cases in which a team is without an overconﬁdent player according to our measure or in
which the overconﬁdent player did not play, 800 cases remain.
In those 800 cases the overconﬁdent players score an average of 11.17 points within a playing time of
28.84 minutes and their average Plus-Minus-Stats is 0.56.
For our analysis the performance of the non-overconﬁdent teammembers is important: Comparing
the Plus-Minus-Stats of the teammates while the overconﬁdent player is on and off court shows that
teams perform signiﬁcantly7 better if the overconﬁdent player is on court. The average Plus-Minus-
Stats without the overconﬁdent player on court total -0.2184 whereas they aggregate to 0.3231 with the
overconﬁdent player on court.
A closer look at the performance of the overconﬁdent player reveals his importance for the teams.
Table 2 shows the performance of the other players depending on whether the overconﬁdent players
performs good (Plus-Minus-Stats greater than zero) or bad (Plus-Minus-Stats below or equal to zero) and
whether he is on court or not.
Not surprisingly, the corresponding χ2-test reveals that the four average Plus-Minus-Stats differ
highly signiﬁcant (χ2-Value is 285.903). It shows that a well performing overconﬁdent player on court
leads to the highest Plus-Minus-Stats of his teammates; while bad performing overconﬁdent players have
the worst Plus-Minus-Stats. Additionally, the results show, that the team is better off with a bad perform-
ing overconﬁdent player off court. Hence for further research the interesting question arises whether
this fact holds for all players or whether the performance of an overconﬁdent player has a higher effect
on the stats of his teammates than a non-overconﬁdent player. If the overconﬁdent player is able to carry
away his team, the negative effects of his overconﬁdence can be compensated by the positive effect he has
on his teammates.
Like the effect on the stats of the teammates the performance of the overconﬁdent player also has an
effect on the result of the game. A correlation test shows, that the correlation between the performance
of the overconﬁdent player (measured as his Plus-Minus-Stats) has a highly signiﬁcant positive effect on
the difference between the achieved points of his own team and the achieved points of the opponent.
3According to 82games.com crunchtime starts in the fourth quarter or overtime, with less than 5 minutes left to play and
neither team ahead by more than 5 points.
4The ﬁnal data set will include all games from the 2005/2006 to the 2009/2010 season.
5The Plus-Minus-Stat shows a team’s net points while the player is on court.
6We do this by using the gameﬂows of www.popcornmachine.net.
7The effect is signiﬁcant at the 10%-Level (Signiﬁcance: 0.053).
4The Correlation Coefﬁcient is .678 (signiﬁcant at the 1% level). Again, the question arises, whether this
positive effect is higher for an overconﬁdent player than for his non-overconﬁdent teammates.
In addition to the described points, in a next step a logistic regression should reveal further effects
of overconﬁdence. A logistic regression goes along the lines of the comparison of Plus-Minus-Stats of a
team with and without the overconﬁdent player on court and by that shows the effects of any individual
player. In this context we will additionally control for the performance of the teams and players in
general. Estimating the logistic regression with the dummy-variable "overconﬁdent player on or off
court" as the dependent variable we will be able to show whether good or bad teams react more to
overconﬁdent players as well as whether overconﬁdent players affect bad teammates more than good
teammates or vice versa.
4 Conclusion
Using a theoretical framework from [1] we show how overconﬁdence might have a positive effect on
the output of a team, if effort-complementarities are high, rational as well as overconﬁdent agents might
beneﬁt from the mistaken self-perception of one agent. This situation is highly applicable to the game of
basketball, since a team’s performance is greatly determined by synergies between the players on court.
So, the production technology described in our model is comparable to the production of an NBA-team.
We isolate a player’s self-perception by analysing his performance during crunchtime and show that
an overconﬁdent player’s performance, even though detrimental at ﬁrst sight (since he scores with less
efﬁciency), has a positive impact on this teammates’ performance. Our analysis of a preliminary data-set
of 800 cases reveals signiﬁcantly higher Plus-Minus-Stats of the remaining players if the overconﬁdent
player is on court. Additionally, the performance of the overconﬁdent player signiﬁcantly favours his
team to win the game.
5Appendix
team oc player ct-games ct-minutes FG% ct-FG% diff.
Atlanta Hawks J. Crawford 36 143 0.45 0.25 -0.20
Boston Celtics K. Perkins 38 127 0.60 0.44 -0.17
Charlotte Bobcats G. Wallace 43 190 0.48 0.32 -0.16
Cleveland Cavaliers A.Varejao 41 115 0.57 0.44 -0.13
Dallas Mavericks J. J. Barea 18 56 0.44 0.33 -0.11
Detroit Pistons W. Bynum 23 67 0.44 0.21 -0.24
Golden State Warriors C.J. Watson 28 73 0.47 0.27 -0.20
Houston Rockets S. Battier 35 151 0.40 0.19 -0.21
Indiana Pacers M. Dunleavy 23 53 0.41 0.08 -0.33
Los Angeles Clippers E. Gordon 25 85 0.45 0.33 -0.12
Los Angeles Lakers R. Artest 26 109 0.41 0.23 -0.19
Memphis Grizzlies O. J. Mayo 44 195 0.46 0.27 -0.19
Miami Heat C. Arroyo 13 59 0.48 0.25 -0.23
Milwaukee Bucks C. Bell 27 71 0.38 0.23 -0.15
Minnesota Timberwolves C. Brewer 32 108 0.43 0.29 -0.14
New Jersey Nets J. Yi 17 52 0.40 0.21 -0.19
New Orleans Hornets M. Thornton 30 91 0.45 0.34 -0.11
New York Knicks W. Chandler 32 140 0.48 0.33 -0.15
Oklahoma City Thunder T. Sefolosha 40 138 0.44 0.25 -0.19
Philadelphia 76ers W. Green 28 94 0.46 0.24 -0.22
Phoenix Suns J. Dudley 33 79 0.46 0.36 -0.10
Portland Trail Blazers N. Batum 20 61 0.52 0.33 -0.19
Sacramento Kings B. Udrih 45 167 0.49 0.40 -0.10
San Antonio Spurs G. Hill 35 108 0.48 0.27 -0.21
Toronto Raptors J. Jack 33 109 0.48 0.27 -0.21
Uta Jazz P. Millsap 24 66 0.54 0.31 -0.23
Washington Wizards M. Miller 22 73 0.50 0.39 -0.11
Average 30.04 102.96 0.47 0.29 -0.18
Table 1: Field goal percentages (FG%) of overconﬁdent (oc) players in the 2009/2010 season overall and
during crunchtime (ct).
6Plus-Minus-Stats of oc player > 0 Plus-Minus-Stats of oc player ≤ 0
oc player on court 4.7328 -3.9136
oc player off court -1.2454 .7683
Table 2: Plus-Minus-Stats of the overconﬁdent player’s teammates.
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